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Abstract
Bootstrapping secure communication among sensor nodes deployed in hostile envi-
ronment is an important and challenging problem. A common approach to solve this
problem is to use a key pre-distribution scheme in which each sensor node is assigned
a subset of keys selected from some key pool. The resilience of a key pre-distribution
scheme depends on the size of the key pool that the scheme uses for distributing keys
among sensor nodes. After deployment, if two sensor nodes are within communica-
tion range of each other and share at least one common key, then they can establish a
secure channel using the common key. We show that, when the key distribution is near-
uniform, the maximum size a key pool that can be used by any key pre-distribution
scheme is upper-bounded by s2
p , where s is the amount of space available on a sensor
node for storing keys and p is the probability that two sensor nodes share a common
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1key. We deﬁne the notion of utilization factor of a key pre-distribution scheme to mea-
sure how eﬀective the scheme is in using the largest key pool available at its disposal
for ﬁxed values of s and p. We explore the eﬀect of the utilization factor of a scheme
on its resilience.
Key words: distributed systems, sensor nodes, wireless network, bootstrapping secure
communication, key pre-distribution
1 Introduction
When sensor nodes are deployed in a hostile environment (e.g., monitoring enemy territory
in a battle), bootstrapping secure communication among neighboring sensor nodes is an
important problem. One approach that has been recently proposed to bootstrap secure
communication is to assign a subset of keys (selected from a key pool) to sensor nodes before
deployment. After deployment, if two sensor nodes are within communication range of each
other, they can establish a secure channel between them in case they share at least one key.
Note that, to determine whether two sensor nodes share a key, it is not necessary for nodes
to exchange their keys. Rather, it is suﬃcient for them to exchange only indices of keys
they possess, which ensures that keys themselves are never sent over insecure channels. This
approach is referred to as key pre-distribution approach [7]. The assignment of keys to sensor
nodes can be either done randomly [7, 4, 6] or deterministically [8, 9, 3, 12].
Key pre-distribution approach is especially attractive for solving the bootstrapping prob-
lem because of two reasons [7, 6]. First, after deployment, the sensor network can operate
independently without any additional infrastructure, which is especially hard to provide in a
hostile environment. Second, the approach uses symmetric cryptography rather than asym-
metric cryptography. The former is more desirable to use than the latter in a sensor network
due to limited computing power, memory and energy available on sensor nodes.
Any key distribution scheme has three main objectives. First, the scheme should maxi-
mize the probability that two sensor nodes share a common key if they ﬁnd themselves to be
neighbors of each other after deployment. In the absence of any deployment knowledge, this
2is achieved by maximizing the probability that any two nodes share a common key. This
probability is referred to as the overlap probability of the scheme [7]. The set of nodes with
which a node shares at least one common key are referred to as its key-neighbors. On the
other hand, the set of nodes that are within communication range of a node are referred
to as its ﬁeld-neighbors. Second, the scheme should minimize the damage caused to the
rest of the network once a certain number of nodes have been compromised. Speciﬁcally, it
should maximize the probability that a channel between two (uncompromised) nodes is still
secure given that a certain number of nodes have been compromised by an adversary. This
is referred to as the degree of resilience of the scheme. Third, the scheme should use as little
space as possible, that is, it should be space-eﬃcient. Sensor nodes typically have severe
resource constraints and, therefore, only have limited amount of space available for storing
keys.
The three requirements are somewhat conﬂicting with each other. For example, a scheme
that guarantees that every pair of sensor nodes share a common key and is perfectly resilient
requires that a sensor node has enough space to store one unique key for each node in the
network. On the other hand, a scheme that requires only one key to be stored on each node
and still guarantees that every pair of sensor nodes share a common key has zero resiliency
(master key based approach). Finally, a scheme that is perfectly resilient and requires only
one key per node has extremely low overlap probability—a node shares a key with only one
other node.
It has been observed by other researchers that, given the amount of space available on
a sensor node and a desired overlap probability, the resilience of the sensor network can be
increased by increasing the size of the key pool from which keys are chosen. We ask the
following fundamental questions. Is there a bound on the maximum size of key pool that can
be used for selecting keys? If yes, what is the exact nature of the bound? We show that, if
the key distribution among sensor nodes is almost uniform, then the maximum key pool size
that can be used by any scheme depends only on two factors, namely the amount of space
available on a sensor node for storing keys and the overlap probability, irrespective of the
number of sensor nodes in the network.
Speciﬁcally, in this paper, we investigate the relationship between various parameters of
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for storing keys, (2) p: the probability that two sensor nodes share a common key, (3) N:
the number of sensor nodes in the system, and (4) K: the size of the key pool used by
a key distribution scheme. We show that, when the key distribution is near uniform and
s ≪ (N − 1)p, the size of the key pool that any key pre-distribution scheme can use for
distributing keys among sensor nodes is upper bounded by a function of s and p, namely
s2/p.
Based on the upper bound established, we deﬁne the notion of utilization factor of a
key pre-distribution scheme. For given values of s and p, the utilization factor of a scheme,
denoted by ρ(s,p), is given by the ratio of the size of the actual key pool used by the
scheme and the maximum size of the key pool that any scheme can use. We also investigate
the relationship between resilience of a key pre-distribution scheme and its eﬀectiveness in
utilizing the largest allowable key pool as measured by its utilization factor. Note that the
notion of utilization factor can be used to evaluate how far a key pre-distribution scheme is
from an optimal scheme.
2 Estimating Bound on Key Pool Size with Near-
Uniform Key Distribution
Our analysis assumes the keys are distributed almost uniformly among sensor nodes. This
is because, intuitively, uniform key distribution improves the resilience of the network. If
some key occurs more frequently than others in sensor nodes, then, once a node containing
that key has been compromised, a large fraction of channels between sensor nodes, which
themselves have not been compromised so far, may be compromised as well. Our assumption
is consistent with the assumption made by other researchers (e.g., [7, 4, 8, 3, 6, 12]).
Let N denote the number of sensor nodes in the system. We assume that N is suﬃciently
large so that N − 1 ≈ N. Let s denote the amount of space (or memory) available on each
sensor node for storing keys. We use K to refer to the size of the key pool. For a key ki in
the key pool, let fi denote the number of sensor nodes in the network that carry the key ki.
4Symbol Meaning
N number of sensor nodes in the network
s amount of space available for storing keys on each sensor node (measured in
terms of number of keys)
p probability that two sensor nodes share a common key
K size of the key pool from which keys are chosen
ki i-th key in the key pool
fi number of sensor nodes that contain the ith key, that is, frequency of key ki
µf mean value of key frequencies
µf =
1
K
K X
i=1
fi
σf standard deviation of key frequencies
σf =
v u u
t 1
K
K X
i=1
(fi − µf)2
κf coeﬃcient of variation of key frequencies
κf =
σf
µf
Table 1: Notation used in this paper
Clearly, for key to be useful, that is, it can be used to establish at least one common channel,
fi is at least 2. Hereafter, in this paper, we assume that each key is useful. Therefore,
K X
i=1
fi = Ns (1)
We have,
∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ K : fi ≥ 2
⇒ { algebra }
K X
i=1
fi ≥ 2K
⇒ { using (1) }
K ≤
Ns
2
5Therefore,
K ≤
Ns
2
(2)
Note that bound in (2) holds irrespective of whether key distribution is uniform or non-
uniform. We now derive a tighter upper bound on key pool size that is independent of the
number of sensor nodes in the network. Let Cs denote the number of pairs of sensor nodes
that share a common key and p be the overlap probability, that is,
Cs =
￿N(N − 1)
2
￿
p =
N(N − 1)p
2
(3)
Assume that all sensor nodes are “identical” in the sense that they have approximately
the same number of key-neighbors. Therefore each sensor node has approximately (N −1)p
key-neighbors. Typically, in a sensor network system, a sensor node is expected to have much
larger number of neighbors than the amount of space it has for storing keys. Therefore, we
assume the following:
s ≤ (N − 1)p (4)
We refer to the ratio
s
(N − 1)p
as the space-constraint factor (SCF) and denote it by γ.
If γ = 1 (that is, s = (N − 1)p), then a sensor node can use a diﬀerent key to encrypt the
channel with each of its key-neighbor (provided the key-neighbor is also its ﬁeld-neighbor).
As a result, the resulting scheme has perfect resilience [4]. However, we expect the space-
constraint factor to be much smaller than 1 in practice. Intuitively, the space-constraint
factor measures the extent by which the space on a sensor node is short of the space required
to achieve perfect resiliency.
Observe that key ki can be used to establish at most fi(fi − 1)/2 secure channels in the
network. Therefore,
Cs ≤
K X
i=1
fi(fi − 1)
2
(5)
In our analysis, we use the following well-known equality in statistics:
K X
i=1
f
2
i = K(µ
2
f + σ
2
f) (6)
where µf and σf denote the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of key frequencies.
The ratio κf =
σf
µf
is known as coeﬃcient of variation and, in our case, measures “variability”
6in key distribution. If the key distribution is almost uniform, that is, all key frequencies are
close to the mean value, then κf ≈ 0 provided µf ≫ 1. Now, we have,
{ using (5) }
Cs ≤
K X
i=1
fi(fi − 1)
2
⇒ { using (3) }
N(N − 1)p
2
≤
1
2
K X
i=1
(f
2
i − fi)
⇒ { using (1) and (6) }
N(N − 1)p ≤ K(µ
2
f + σ
2
f) − Ns
⇒ { simplifying }
N(N − 1)p + Ns ≤ Kµ
2
f(1 + κ
2
f)
⇒ { from (1), Kµf = Ns which implies that µf =
Ns
K
}
N(N − 1)p + Ns ≤ K
N2s2
K2 (1 + κ
2
f)
⇒ { simplifying }
K ≤
Ns2
(N − 1)p + s
(1 + κ
2
f)
⇒ { simplifying }
K ≤
￿ N
N − 1
￿￿s2
p
￿￿1 + κ2
f
1 + γ
￿
⇒ { N is large which implies that N − 1 ≈ N }
K ≤
￿s2
p
￿￿1 + κ2
f
1 + γ
￿
Note that γ lies in the range (0,1]. In fact, in real life, we expect γ to be much smaller
than 1. For example, for N = 10,000, p = 0.2 and s = 100, γ =
s
(N − 1)p
= 0.05 ≈ 0. It
turns out that if the key distribution is almost uniform, then γ and µf are closely related.
Again, assume that each sensor node has approximately the same number of key-neighbors.
Each key ki on a sensor node can be used by the node to establish at most fi − 1 secure
channels with its neighbors, which is approximately equal to µf − 1. We have,
(N − 1)p ≤ s(µf − 1)
7⇒ { simplifying }
µf ≥
(N − 1)p
s
+ 1
⇒ { deﬁnition of γ }
µf ≥
1
γ
+ 1
In case γ ≪ 1, µf ≫ 2. This in turn implies that, when the key distribution is almost
uniform, κf ≪ 1, where κf is the coeﬃcient of variation. Therefore, we have,
K ≤
s2
p
￿1 + κ2
f
1 + γ
￿
≈
s2
p
(7)
We denote the expression
s2
p
by Kmax. Intuitively, Kmax denotes the maximum size of
the key pool that can be used for given values of s and p. We refer to the ratio of the actual
key pool size to the maximum key pool size as the utilization factor (UF) and denote it by
ρ(s,p).
The assumption that all sensor nodes are identical is not really necessary. Let savg and
pavg denote the average space and average overlap probability, respectively, of a sensor node.
Formally,
savg =
1
N
N X
i=1
si and pavg =
1
N
N X
i=1
pi
where si and pi denote space and overlap probability, respectively, for the i-th sensor node.
It can be shown that (7) still holds provided s is replaced with savg and p is replaced with
pavg [13].
2.1 Bound on Key Pool Size when Deployment Knowledge is Used
Du et al. [5] and Liu et al. [10, 11] show that the resilience of the network can be improved
substantially (at least against random attacks by an adversary) by using deployment knowl-
edge at the time of distributing keys among sensor nodes. Deployment knowledge basically
limits the number of sensor nodes that can be neighbors of a given sensor node in the ﬁeld.
The main reason for improvement in resiliency is that deployment knowledge allows a much
bigger key pool size to be used than is otherwise possible. Does it mean that the upper bound
derived in the previous section does not hold when deployment knowledge is used during key
8distribution? The answer is no. The upper bound holds as long as key distribution is al-
most uniform and space constraint factor is small (that is, coeﬃcient of variation is small).
However, the reason for the improvement in resilience can be explained as follows. We call
two sensor nodes as region-neighbors if that can potentially be neighbors of each other in
the ﬁeld after deployment (based on the deployment knowledge). Let η denote the ratio of
the number of region-neighbors of a sensor node to the total number of sensor nodes in the
network. Further, let plocal denote the probability that a sensor node shares a common key
with its region-neighbor. We refer to plocal as the local overlap probability. Therefore the
probability that any two sensor nodes share a common key, which we refer to as the global
overlap probability, is given by pglobal = η × plocal. (We assume that two sensor nodes may
possibly share a common key only if they are region-neighbors of each other.)
For instance, suppose N = 10,000 and consider a sensor node α. In the absence of any
deployment knowledge, any subset of the remaining 9,999 sensor nodes can be neighbors
of α in the ﬁeld after deployment. Now, suppose, using deployment knowledge, we can
identify a set of 1,000 sensor nodes, say Pα such that only nodes from Pα can potentially be
neighbors of α. In this case, it is suﬃcient for a key pre-distribution scheme to ensure that
α shares a key with only nodes in Pα with certain overlap probability, say 0.5. Therefore,
η = 1000/10000 = 0.1, plocal = 0.5 and pglobal = 0.1 × 0.5 = 0.05.
When no deployment knowledge is assumed, η = 1 implying that pglobal = plocal. Based on
the analysis in the previous section, the size of key pool that can be used is upper bounded
by:
K ≤
s2
pglobal
=
s2
η plocal
(8)
For ﬁxed values of s and plocal, the size of the key pool can be increased by decreasing η,
which, in turn, depends on the extent of the deployment knowledge. Therefore, deployment
knowledge helps improve resiliency of the network by decreasing η which, in turn, decreases
pglobal. Reducing pglobal increases the size of the key pool that can be used for assigning keys
to sensor nodes.
93 Eﬀect of Utilization Factor on Network Resiliency
Suppose an adversary has compromised w randomly selected sensor nodes, where w ≥ 1.
Therefore all keys stored in these nodes have been revealed to the adversary. Consider a
channel c between two sensor nodes that have not been compromised. We are interested
in computing the probability that the channel c has been compromised. Let Aw denote
the event that the adversary has compromised w sensor nodes at random. Further, let Bi
denote the event that c uses key ki for encryption and let Ci denote the event that the key
ki has been compromised. Du et al. show in [6] that, when key distribution is uniform,
the probability that channel c has been compromised given that w sensor nodes, chosen at
random, have been compromised already is given by:
Pr(c has been compromised | Aw) =
K X
i=1
Pr(Bi)Pr(Ci | Aw) = K  
1
K
  Pr(C1 | Aw)
= Pr(C1 | Aw) (9)
If w is small compared to N, and key distribution is almost uniform, then:
Pr(C1 | Aw) ≈ 1 −
￿
1 −
f1
N
￿w
≈ 1 −
￿
1 −
µf
N
￿w
(10)
Using (1), it follows that Ns = Kµf. This implies that:
µf
N
=
s
K
(11)
Combining (9), (10) and (11), we obtain,
Pr(c is compromised | Aw) ≈ 1 −
￿
1 −
s
K
￿w
≈ 1 − (1 −
w s
K
)
=
w s
ρ(s,p) Kmax
=
￿ w s
ρ(s,p)
￿￿ p
s2
￿
=
￿w p
s
￿ 1
ρ(s,p)
(12)
In other words, probability that a channel between two uncompromised sensor nodes
has been compromised is directly proportional to the number of nodes that have been com-
promised and the overlap probability. Further, it is inversely proportional to the utilization
10factor and the amount of key space available on a sensor node. Consequently, for ﬁxed values
of s, p and w, the resilience of the network can be increased by increasing the utilization
factor of the key distribution scheme.
4 Extensions to the Basic Key Pre-distribution
Scheme
In our analysis of resiliency so far, we assume that a key corresponds to a simple symmetric
cryptographic key. Therefore, once even a single node containing a given key is compromised,
all channels encrypted using that key are compromised as well. However, there are other
more sophisticated schemes which use either a matrix of size (λ + 1) × (λ + 1) [1] or a
bivariate polynomial of degree λ [2] to compute a pairwise key between two sensor nodes.
These schemes satisfy the desirable property that the scheme is completely secure as long as
λ or fewer nodes have been compromised. Further, once λ+1 nodes have been compromised,
the scheme is completely broken, that is, the adversary can potentially decrypt all messages
encrypted using the cryptographic scheme.
Du et al. [6] and Liu et al. [12] describe key pre-distribution approaches in which the key
pool consists of multiple instances of these cryptographic schemes (matrix- or polynomial-
based). Each sensor node carries a subset of the instances selected from the key pool (or,
more appropriately, instance pool). If two sensor nodes share at least one instance, then
the common instance can be used to establish a pairwise key among the nodes. The two
approaches can be simply seen as a kind of key pre-distribution approach in which a key
corresponds to an instance of matrix- or polynomial-based scheme [10].
Note that the upper bound established on key pool size in Section 2 is applicable to such
key pre-distribution approaches as well. For such approaches, s is taken to be the number of
instances that a sensor node can carry instead of the number of keys. The total amount of
space used by a sensor node is then given by m = (λ+1)s (and not s as in the case of a simple
key-based cryptographic scheme). Du et al. show in [6] that, with matrix-based scheme, the
probability that a channel between two uncompromised nodes has been compromised given
11that w sensor nodes have been compromised already remains close to zero for relatively large
values of w. Moreover, there is a value of w after which the probability starts increasing
almost exponentially. This change in behavior (or breaking point) approximately occurs at
wbp ≈ m
K
s2. We have,
wbp ≈ m
K
s2
= (λ + 1)s
ρ(s,p) Kmax
s2
= (λ + 1)
ρ(s,p) s2
s p
=
￿(λ + 1) s
p
￿
ρ(s,p) (13)
Note that the value of the breaking point is directly proportional to s, λ and ρ(s,p) and
inversely proportional to p. Again, as before, for ﬁxed values of s, p and λ, the value at
which the breaking point occurs can be increased by increasing the utilization factor of the
key (or instance) distribution scheme.
Du et al. [6] observe that their scheme, which is derived from Blom’s matrix-based scheme
[1], has better resilience than Blom’s scheme for the same amount of space. However, the
main reason for the improvement is that Blom’s scheme always has an overlap probability of
1, whereas Du et al.’s scheme has overlap probability smaller than 1. Basically, by lowering
the overlap probability, they are able to increase the value of the breaking point. Since
the utilization factor of their scheme is much smaller than 1, especially when p is large (at
least 0.5), the value of the breaking point can be further increased by using a scheme for
distributing instances among sensor nodes with better utilization factor [8].
5 Conclusion
For a given amount of space available on a sensor node for storing keys and a given probability
of key overlap between sensor nodes, the resilience of a network depends on the size of the key
pool used by a key pre-distribution scheme. In this paper, we have derived an upper bound
on the size of the key pool that any key pre-distribution scheme can use for assigning keys
to sensor nodes. Our upper bound can be used to quantify how far a key pre-distribution
12scheme is from optimality.
Two key pre-distribution schemes that are near optimal in terms of key pool size may
diﬀer in other respects. For example, if two sensor nodes that do not share a common
key wish to communicate securely, then they have to agree on a secret key using a secure
path consisting of one or more sensor nodes (in case it exists). Therefore, in addition to
resilience, another important measure of performance of a key pre-distribution scheme is the
communication overhead (in terms of number of hops) required to establish such path-based
keys [7]. Even if two schemes are near optimal with respect to key pool size, they may still
have diﬀerent communication overheads, thereby making one preferable over the other.
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